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1961] RECENT CASES 115
possible for a consumer to present particularized proof as to the manufac-
turer's negligence.3
The dissenting judges relied on Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey.
4
The trial judge in this case placed the question of whether the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine applied properly before the jury or circumstantial evidence which
might well justify a finding by the jury that it did apply. The dissent in
the instant case thought it very improbable that some evilly disposed person
took the cap off the Coke bottle and inserted the foreign substance after
the bottle left defendant's control. The dissent quoted favorably from Ruther-
ford v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.5
The Jordan Case,6 and the instant case well illustrate the present stand of
the Utah Supreme Court upon the extent of control necessary for the defend-
ant to have over the offending instrumentality in order to make out a case of
res ipsa loquitur. The element of control has not received the extension (con-
sisting primarily of a relaxation of the requirement of exclusive control) in
order to make the doctrine applicable to new situations in this jurisdiction
which have characterized the application of the doctrine in other jurisdic-
tions.
7
Since no case in point has reached the North Dakota Supreme Court, it ap-
pears that North Dakota would follow the numerical weight of authoritys and
support the application of res ipsa loquitur in contaminated food and beverage
cases.
WM. J. WARD.
GAS - FRANCHISES, PRIVILEGES, AND POWERS IN GENERAL - PIPELINE COM-
PANY SELLING NATURAL GAS TO DISTRIBUTORS AND INDUSTRIAL USERS NOT A
PUBLIC UTILrry. - The Colorado Interstate Gas Company operates a natural
gas pipeline which transmits gas from Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas, and serves
most of the major cities on the eastern slope of Colorado selling gas to public
utilities for resale. It also sells gas directly to eleven customers who use gas
for their own needs and purposes.1 The Colorado Public Utilities Commis-
sion, on the basis of these facts, found Interstate to be a public utility and
ordered it to apply for a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The
district court reversed the order of the commission. On appeal the Supreme
Court of Colorado held, two justices dissenting, that the company's action in
selling. gas to eleven customers directly does not make it a public utility as
3. Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 117 Utah 578, 218 P.2d 660 (Utah 1950) (dis-
senting opinion). See also Keller v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 330 P.2d 346 (1958).
4. 83 Ariz. 13, 371 P.2d 1094 (1957).
5. 142 W.Va. 681, 97 S.E.2d 803 (1957).
6. 218 P.2d 660 (Utah 1950).
7. See Rutherford v. Huntington Coca Cola Bottling Co., 142 W.Va. 681, 97 S.E.2d
803, 808 (1957).
8. Dr. Pepper Co. v. Brittain, 234 Ala. 548, 176 So. 286 (1937); Southwestern Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Northern, 65 Ariz. 172, 177 P.2d 219 (1947); Coca Cola Bottling
Co. v. Spurlin, 199 Ark. 126, 132 S.W.2d 828 (1939); Dalton Cpca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Watkins, 70 Ga. App. 790, 29 S.E.2d 281 (1944); Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Williams,
111 Ind. App. 502, 37 N.E.2d 702 (1941); Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Petty, 190
Miss. 631, 200 So. 128 (1941).
1. Re Colorado Interstate Gas Co., Colorado Public Utilities Commission, 27 I.U.R.3
,
1
85 (1959) "It is istimated that Interstate sells 25 to 35 per cent of its total volume
directly to ultimate consumers the balance is sold to regulated intrastate public utilities for
resale."
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defined by statute, nor within the meaning of tests laid down by this court in
construing said statute. Public Utilities Commission v. Colorado Interstate Gas
Company, 351 P.2d 241 (Colo. 1960).
The Colorado statute,2 which defines public utilities, specifically mentions
pipeline corporations and gas corporations, and therefore would appear to be
broad enough to include pipeline companies which sell gas for resale or directly
to consumers.3 In several decisions, power companies,
4 pipeline companies, 5
gas companies,0 and electric companies 7 have been found to be public utilities
although not one of them sold directly to consumers. Interstate pipelines fall
into a special classification because the Federal Government in enacting the
Federal Natural Gas Act has taken upon itself the regulation of the sale of
natural gas for resale. 8 Since the Federal Government has occupied this field,
such activities are beyond the power of the state to regulate.9 Sales by an
interstate transmission company directly to an industrial consumer are ex-
empted from the application of the act,10 and the commission has no author-
ity to regulate these customers." Direct sales to the ultimate consumer are
subject to state regulation which is not necessarily precluded by the fact that
the product is sold or transported in interstate corhmerce.1
2
The question remains as to whether sales by a natural gas company direct
to consumers constitutes a public utility. The Supreme Court in this case
answered the question in the negative and held that Interstate is not a public
uility as defined by statute,' 3 nor within the meaning of tests' 4 laid down by
2. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 115-1-3 (1953). The statute defines a public utility as, "every
. . . pipe line corporation, gas corporation . . . operating for the purpose of supplying
the public . . . and every corporation, or person now or hereafter declared by law to be
affected with a public interest, and each thereof, is hereby declared to be a public
utility . . ".
3. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 115-1-3 (1953) (Note that the statute itself says "every pipe
line corporation" and "gas corporation" these words cannot be omitted since they evidence
the legislative intent to subject to regulation the type of service which has been tradi-
tionally regarded as a utility subject to regulation).
4. Salisbury and So. Ry. Co. v. Southern Power, 179 N.C. 330, 102 S.E. 625 (1920)
(electric power).
5. People's Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 270 Pa. 252, 123 Atl. 799
(1924) (gas).
6. Ornoff v. Public Utilities Commission, 135 Ohio St. 438, 21 N.E.2d 334 (1939)
(natural gas).
7. Southern Oklahoma Power Co. v. Corporation Commission, 96 Okla. 53, 220 Pac.
370 (1923) (electricity). (In view of these decisions it would appear that the suppliers of
public utilities should also be subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commissions).
8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717(b) (1948) "The provisions of this act shall apply to the trans-
portation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of
natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption, foi domestic, commercial, industrial,
or any other use, and to natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale . . ."
9. Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942).
10. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717(b) (1948) which states "...ne act shall not apply to any
other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to
the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas."
11. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, 332 U.S. 507
(1947). City of Hastings v. Kansas-Neb. Gas Co., 221 F.2d 31 (W.C. Cir. 1954).
12. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 341 U.S.
329 (1947); Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U.S.
498, 1942); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U.S. 224 (1938); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v.
Public Service Commissiofi, 252 U.S. 23 (1920).
13. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 115-1-3 (1953).
14. Public Utilities Commission v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 351 P.2d 241 (1960)
These tests include: (1) affected with a public interest, See Tyson and Brothers v. Banton,
273 U.S. 418, 451 (1927), (2) readiness and willingness coupled with a present ability
to serve the public, (3) dedication of facilities to serve the public. For an excellent dis-
cussion see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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the court in construing said statute. 5 There is, at least, one decision which
has decided this question and reached a result contrary to the Colorado posi-
tion.' 6
What, then, could have been the basis for the decision in the principal
case? The court states that in the statute17 adopted in 1913, now remaining
and unchanged for forty-seven years, none of the statesi s promulgated by the
Public Service Commission appear. 19
It is submitted that in determining the utility or non-utility status of a
given industry, the facts in each particular case must be the determining
factor. However, the courts should give liberal interpretation to statutes
which permit government regulation of business if public policy is to follow
the trends it has established over the years in developing our economic
system.
KERMIT EDVARD BYE.
I{OMOCIDE - CORPUS DELICTI - BODY MISSING. - Defendant was convicted
of the murder of his wife who simply disappeared from her home, dropped
out of sight and has not been heard from since. The prosecution contended
that the evidence proved defendant's motive for doing away with his wife.
He had coveted her estate, attempted to prepare her friends for an explanation
of her departure, and was pleased at her subsequent disappearance. More-
over, he deceived her friends and the authorities in order to prevent an in-
vestigation and set about through forgeries and thefts to steal her property.
Defendant then fled the country only to be apprehended at the Canadian
border. The state contends his flight was precipated by his fear of prosecution
for the murder of his wife. The prosecution offered no evidence of the use
of criminal means to accomplish death, produced no body and proved no
confession. Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to estab-
lish the corpus delicti. On appeal the California District Court of Appeal,
held, in homocide prosecutions, all that is required to prove death is circum-
stantial evidence sufficient to convince minds of reasonable men of existence
of fact. People v. Scott, 1 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1960).
The trial court based it's decision on two recent cases, Regina v. Onu-
freiczyk' an English decision, and The King v. Horry2 a New Zeland de-
15. Public Utilities Commission v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 351 P.2d 241 (1960).
16. Industrial Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 135 Ohio St. 408, 21 N.E.2d
166 (1939) (Company had 50 miles of pipeline and -supplied 19 industrial users, held: a
public utility).
17. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 115-1-3 (1953).
18. Public Utilities Commission v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 351 P.2d 241 (1960).
The Public Utilities Commission promulgated its own tests for determining public utility
status: and are based on the nature of the service rendered to include, (1) whether a
natural or virtual monopoly, (2) the exorbitance or r-asonableness of the charges, (3) the
arbitrary control to which its customers may be subject' d, (4) whether or not the impact
of its service, or the lack thereof, to a class of customers affects the state or community,
(5) and whether the services rendered are needful and cannot be surrendered without
obvious general loss and inconvenience.
19. Public Utilities Commission v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 351 P.2d 241 (1960)
"We find no precedent for the rule as announced by the commission. It contains no
standard whereby it could be applied with any degree of uniformity; it furnishes no guide
whereby the supplier or the customer could determine the utility or non-utility status of the
supplier."
1. [19551 1 Q.B. 388.
2. [1952] N.Z.L.R. 111.
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